Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. We also characterize the speed with which this probability approaches one as the population grows.
Introduction
As a theory of social justice, utilitarianism is quite appealing. But as a practical criterion for collective choice, it has serious shortcomings. To apply the utilitarian criterion, we not only need accurate information about the cardinal utility functions of all individuals in society; we must also know how to make cardinal interpersonal comparisons between these utility functions. These informational problems are compounded by two other factors. First, a person may strategically misrepresent her utility. Second, she may inadvertently misperceive her own utility function, either through lack of self-knowledge, or because she does not fully understand the long-term consequences of the policies under consideration. For these reasons (among others), collective decisions are almost never made by trying to explicitly ascertain the utility functions of the members of society (e.g. via a survey). Instead, collective decisions are usually made by voting.
A scoring rule is a particular kind of voting rule where each voter assigns a "score" to each alternative (with some constraints), and the alternative with the highest aggregate score wins. Well-known scoring rules include the Borda rule, the plurality and anti-plurality rules, evaluative (or "range") voting, and approval voting. Since they involve maximizing a sum, scoring rules seem like a sort of "ersatz utilitarianism". We will show that this is more than just a superficial formal resemblance. If the probability distribution of utility functions in a large society satisfies certain conditions, then we will show that a well-chosen scoring rule has a very high probability of selecting the alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. For a sufficiently large population, this probability can be made arbitrarily close to certainty. Thus, with the right scoring rule, we can realize the utilitarian ideal, despite the informational problems described above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers evaluative voting. Section 3 considers approval voting. Section 4 considers rank scoring rules, such as the Borda rule or the plurality rule. Each section introduces one or more scenarios (described by hypotheses concerning the probability distribution of utility functions), and then, for each scenario, gives an asymptotic probability result. Appendix A reviews some results from Pivato (2014b) that are used in the other proofs. Appendix B contains the proofs of all the results in the paper.
Related literature. The results in this paper are complementary to those in Pivato (2014a,b) . Like the present paper, Pivato (2014a) considers conditions under which ordinal voting rules maximize the utilitarian social welfare function (SWF) in a large population. But whereas this paper focuses on scoring rules, Pivato (2014a) focuses on Condorcet consistent rules such as the Copeland rule or an agenda of pairwise majority votes. Meanwhile, Pivato (2014b) considers a broader problem: how can we compute (and maximize) the utilitarian SWF when we have only very imprecise information about people's utility functions and the correct system of interpersonal utility comparisons, and when people can be strategically dishonest? Under plausible conditions, Pivato (2014b) shows that, in a large population, we can accurately estimate the utilitarian SWF despite these difficulties. Indeed, this can be done in a strategy-proof way, using a modified version of the Groves-Clarke pivotal mechanism.
We will evaluate ordinal voting rules from a utilitarian perspective. This approach was pioneered by Rae (1969) , Taylor (1969) and Weber (1978) . Rae and Taylor assumed that all voters had equal preference intensities over a dichotomous choice, given by independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random {0, 1}-valued utility functions. In this setting, they showed that simple majority vote maximized the expected value of the utilitarian SWF, amongst all anonymous voting rules.
1 Weber (1978) considered a setting with many alternatives, and variable preference intensities. Assuming that the voters' utilities for the different alternatives were independent, uniformly distributed (i.u.d.) random variables, he sought the voting rule which maximized the expected value of the utilitarian SWF in a large population. He showed that the Borda rule was the optimal rule in the class of rank scoring rules.
2 The results in Section 4 can be seen as a major generalization of this early insight. In the case of exactly three alternatives, Weber (1978) also showed that the approval voting rule slightly outperforms the Borda rule; we will study the utilitarian efficiency of approval voting in Section 3.
Shortly after Weber's foundational work, Bordley (1983 Bordley ( , 1985a and Merrill (1984) used computer simulations to estimate the expected value of the utilitarian SWF for various voting rules. Bordley (1985b Bordley ( , 1986 ) computed utilitarian-optimal weighted majority voting schemes for dichotomous decisions with correlated voters. But there was no further utilitarian analysis of voting rules for the next twenty years.
Starting in 2005, a literature emerged on the utilitarian analysis of federal representative assemblies. Most of these papers focussed on dichotomous decisions, and assumed that the utility functions of the citizens were i.i.d. random variables. They asked: which voting rule will maximise the expected value of the utilitarian SWF?
3 First, Beisbart et al. (2005) computationally compared the performance of seven benchmark rules, while Barberà and Jackson (2006) gave an exact formula for the utilitarian-optimal weighted majority rule in terms of the distribution of utility functions found within each state. Next, Beisbart and Bovens (2007) and Bovens and Hartmann (2007) investigated the consequences of different population-based weighting formulas with a mixture of theoretical analysis and computational results. Laruelle and Valenciano (2008, Ch.3; 2010, §7) provided a utilitarian rational for the classic Penrose "square root" weighting formula. Macé and Treibich (2012) and Koriyama et al. (2013) derived analytical results in scenarios where voters have non-separable preferences over a series of dichotomies.
4 In contrast to all the previously mentioned papers, Fleurbaey (2009) and Beisbart and Hartmann (2010) considered models with correlated voters. In Biesbart and Hartmann's model, the profile of utility functions is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, whereas Fleurbaey's model is extremely general; the correlation structure between voters is completely arbitrary.
5 Finally, Maaser and Napel (2014) used computer simulations to find utilitarian-optimal voting weights in a setting with three or more alternatives arranged on a line (with single-peaked preferences). The overall message of these papers is that, with i.i.d. voters, the expected value of utilitarian social welfare is generally maximized by a "degressive" weighted majority rule, where the weight of a nation is a sub-linear function (e.g. square root) of its population.
6 With non-independent and/or non-identical voters, the optimal weights can depend on the correlations and preference intensities.
Aside from Maaser and Napel (2014) , these papers only considered dichotomies. 7 But other recent papers have considered three or more alternatives, in the context of direct democracy. Lehtinen (2007 Lehtinen ( , 2008 used computer simulations to show that strategic voting often improves the utilitarian efficiency of the Borda rule and approval voting. Caragiannis and Procaccia (2011) estimated the "distortion" of the plurality, approval, and antiplurality voting rules -that is, the worst-case ratio between the utilitarian social welfare of the optimal alternative, and the utilitarian social welfare of the alternative which actually wins, where the worst case is computed over all possible profiles of "normalized" utility functions. (A utility function is "normalized" if it is positive and the utilities sum to one.) Procaccia and Caragiannis were particularly interested in the asymptotic growth rate of this distortion ratio as the number of voters and/or alternatives becomes large. They showed that, if voters randomly convert their cardinal utility functions into voting behaviours in a plausible way, then the expected distortion ratio grows surprisingly slowly. Their intended application was preference aggregation in a cooperating group of artificially intelligent agents (e.g. Mars rovers), but their results are also applicable to more traditional social welfare problems. This approach has recently been extended by Boutilier et al. (2012) , who study the worst-case and average-case performance of randomized social choice rules.
Given a social welfare function W , and the probability distribution of the voters' cardinal utility functions, Apesteguia et al. (2011) asked: what ordinal voting rule maximizes the expected value of W ? If W is the utilitarian SWF, and the voters' utilities are i.i.d. random variables, they showed that the W -optimal rule is a rank scoring rule of the kind we consider in Section 4.
8 In particular, if the voters' utilities are i.u.d. random variables, then the W -optimal rule is the Borda rule. The results in Section 4 of this paper can be seen as complementary to those of Apesteguia et al. (2011) ; while they show that a certain scoring rule is better, on average, than any alternative voting rule, we show that, in a large 5 Fleurbaey (2009) also provides a utilitarian analysis of direct democracy, including a far-reaching generalization of the Rae-Taylor theorem to a setting where voters may have different preference intensities and arbitrary correlations.
6 There is also a vast literature on voting power in representative assemblies, which reaches similar conclusions; see e.g. Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) for a survey.
7 Fleurbaey (2009; §7) notes that his approach can be applied to any number of issues, because it assigns a distinct weight to each voter for each binary comparison (proportional to her preference intensity) and thereby evades the Condorcet paradox. However, his weighting formula is very informationally demanding.
8 Apesteguia et al. (2011) also consider the case when W is the maximin or maximax SWF.
population, it approaches perfect agreement with the utilitarian social choice. Giles and Postl (2012) conducted a similar investigation for (A, B)-voting rules, a twoparameter family of rules introduced by Myerson (2002) , which includes approval vote as well as rank scoring rules. Giles and Postl suppose there are three alternatives, whose utilities for each voter are privately known i.i.d. random variables on the interval [0, 1]. Unlike Apesteguia et al., they focus only on the utilitarian SWF, and they allow strategic voting. Giles and Postl first characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for the N -player strategic voting game for any N ≥ 2. Then they numerically compute the expected value of the utilitarian SWF at the three-player BNE for various (A, B) ∈ [0, 1] 2 (where the three players' utilities are i.i.d. random variables drawn from either a uniform distribution or a beta distribution on [0, 1]). The results on approval voting in Section 3 of this paper can be seen as complementary to the findings of Giles and Postl (2012) , but extended to an arbitrary number of alternatives and a large number of voters. Kim (2014) pushes this investigation further. In a setting with three or more alternatives, and voters with independent (but not identically distributed) random utilities, he characterizes the rules which are ex ante Pareto efficient in the class of ordinal voting rules: they are "non-anonymous" rank scoring rules (where each voter has perhaps a different score vector). He further shows that, in a "neutral" environment (i.e. all alternatives are ex ante interchangeable), such rules are incentive compatible (i.e. truth-revealing in BNE). Special cases of Kim's analysis are the rank scoring rules which maximize ex ante utilitarian social welfare over all ordinal rules. In particular, Kim observes that the rank scoring rules of Apesteguia et al. (2011) are incentive-compatible in the i.i.d. environment of their paper.
9 He then constructs incentive-compatible voting rules which, in terms of the utilitarian SWF, are superior to any ordinal rule (in particular, any scoring rule), but which utilize only a limited amount of cardinal utility information from the voters. Azrieli and Kim (2014) perform a similar analysis for a dichotomy in which voters have independent (but not identically distributed) random utilities. They show that the rule which maximizes ex ante utilitarian social welfare over the class of all incentive compatible rules is a weighted majoritarian rule (where the weight of each voter is determined by the expected value of her utility function). They also obtain a similar characterization of the ex ante and ex interim Pareto-optimal rules in the class of incentive-compatible rules.
The majority of the aforementioned papers deal only with dichotomous decisions, whereas we allow an arbitrary number of alternatives.
10 Also, except for Fleurbaey (2009) , all of the aforementioned papers assumed that cardinal interpersonal utility comparisons are unproblematic. In contrast, we suppose that these interpersonal comparisons themselves are ambiguous in practice (but still meaningful in principle). Finally, except for Weber (1978) and Caragiannis and Procaccia (2011) , all of the aforementioned papers deal with "small" populations of voters, whereas we are interested in asymptotic probabilistic results for very large populations.
11 It is not possible here to adequately summarise the vast and growing literature on the large-population asymptotic probabilistic analysis of voting rules. Instead, we will only briefly touch on two strands of this literature. The first strand is the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and its many generalizations.
12 Like the CJT literature, the results of the present paper say that, under certain probabilistic assumptions, a large population using a certain voting rule is likely to arrive at the "correct" decision. But the goal for the CJT literature is to find the correct answer to some objective factual question, whereas the goal in the present paper is to maximize social welfare.
The second strand is the literature on strategic voting and/or strategic candidacy in large populations with some kind of randomness or uncertainty in voters' preferences. This literature is mainly concerned with characterizing the Nash equilibria of certain large election games. These equilibria occasionally have surprising social welfare properties. For example, Ledyard (1984) , Weibull (1987, 1993) , Coughlin (1992; Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 4.4), Banks and Duggan (2004; §4) and McKelvey and Patty (2006) have all shown that, in certain election games, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (sometimes called a "political equilibrium") where all the candidates select the policy which maximizes a utilitarian SWF. But these utilitarian SWFs are based on somewhat peculiar systems of interpersonal utility comparisons. In these models, voter behaviour is described by a stochastic device: the probability that voter i votes for candidate C (or in some cases, the probability that i votes at all) is a function of the difference between the cardinal utility which i assigns to C and the cardinal utility she assigns to other candidates. Although the different models use different stochastic devices and seek to capture different phenomena (e.g. random private costs for voting, or random private shocks to the utility functions, or random individual errors due to bounded rationality, or other exogenous perturbations), each model assumes that utility functions are translated into voting probabilities in the same way for every voter. In this way, each model smuggles in a system of "implicit" interpersonal utility comparisons via the stochastic device. As observed by Banks and Duggan (2004, p.29) , this means that the normative significance of the "utilitarianism" emerging from these political equilibria is somewhat unclear.
In contrast, this paper assumes that there is a pre-existing, normatively meaningful system of cardinal interpersonal utility comparisions, explicitly described by a set of "calibration constants" which exist independently of the voting rule and any other random factors in the model. The social planner does not know the exact values of these calibration constants, so she she regards them as random variables. Our results suggest that it is still possible to closely approximate the utilitarian social choice, even with this kind of uncertainty. On the other hand, unlike the political equilibrium literature described in the previous paragraph, this paper does not grapple with strategic issues, except in the conclusion. Also, unlike the political equilibrium literature, this paper treats the social al-11 Since they consider a democratic federation of states, the papers by Barberà and Jackson (2006) , Beisbart, Bovens and Hartmann, etc. presumably posit large populations. However, most of these papers represent each population in reduced form as an averaged utility function, not as a set of individuals, and none of them engage in any sort of asymptotic analysis.
12 See Nitzan (2009, Ch.11-12) or Pivato (2013) for surveys of this literature.
ternatives as exogenous, rather than endogenizing them as the result of political candidates competing for popularity.
Evaluative voting
The most natural "utilitarian" voting rule simply asks the each voter to assign a numerical score to each alternative, presumably reflecting the utility she would obtain from that alternative. The obvious problem with this approach is that voters could strategically exaggerate their scores. One partial solution is to rescale every voter's utility function to range over the interval [0, 1] . 13 The resulting social choice rule has been called evaluative voting (Núñez and Laslier, 2014) , utilitarian voting (Hillinger, 2005) , or range voting (Smith, 2000; Macé, 2013) . It is closely related to the relative utilitarian SWF axiomatized by Dhillon (1998) and Dhillon and Mertens (1999) .
Before continuing, let us fix some notation which will be maintained throughout the paper. Let R denote the set of real numbers. For any set A and function f : A−→R, let argmax A (f ) denote the set of elements in A which maximize f . For any random variable X, let E[X] denote its expected value, and let var[X] denote its variance.
Let A be a finite set of social alternatives, let I be a set of voters, and let I := |I|. (1) Does EV also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function? If not, how close does it come to this goal? For every voter i in I let w i : A−→R be her "true" utility function. We suppose these utility functions admit one-for-one cardinal interpersonal comparisons. In other words, for any alternatives a, b, c, and
, then the welfare that voter i gains in moving from a to b is exactly the same as the welfare that voter j gains in moving from c to d. We therefore want to maximize the utilitarian SWF U I defined by
Let w i := min{w i (a); a ∈ A}. By replacing w i with the function w i := w i −w i if necessary, we can suppose that min{w i (a); a ∈ A} = 0, for every voter i in I. Clearly this does not affect the maximizer of (2). Next, let c i := max{w i (a); a ∈ A}, and then define u i (a) := w i (a)/c i , for every voter i in I and every alternative a in A. Note that each u i ranges over the interval [0, 1] . The relative utilitarian social welfare function RU : A−→R is defined:
13 Obviously, this is not a complete solution to strategic voting.
The scaling constants {c i } i∈I represent the "preference intensities" of the voters, which we assume are unknown to the social planner. From the planner's point of view, {c i } i∈I are random variables. We formalize this with the following assumption:
(E1) {c i } i∈I are real-valued random variables, which are independent, but not necessarily identically distributed. There is some constant σ Hypotheses (E1) does not allow the preference intensities of different voters to be correlated; it cannot accommodate a scenario where voter i is likely to have strong preferences if voter j does. However, (E1) does allow that certain types of voters tend to have more intense preferences than other voters, for certain types of policy problems; for example, parents of young children might have especially intense preferences about education policies, while industrialists might have strong preferences about regulations affecting their industry.
Assuming voter i uses the full range [0, 1] to express her utilities, but is otherwise accurate, she will set v i = w i . If all voters behave in this way, then V I = RU I . But voter i may misperceive her own utility function. Thus, in general, v i = u i + i , where i : A−→R is a random "error" function. Suppose a i and a i are the minimizer and maximizer of u i (thus, u i (a i ) = 0 and u i (a i ) = 1). It is reasonable to suppose that v i (a i ) = 0 and v i (a i ) = 1 -that is, voter i reliably assigns a score of 0 to her worst alternative and a score of 1 to her best alternative. Thus, i (a i ) = i (a i ) = 0. However, for the other alternatives in A, the errors may be nonzero. We assume they satisfy the following condition:
(E2) For each alternative a in A, the random errors { i (a)} i∈I are independent, 14 but not necessarily identically distributed. There is some constant σ 2 > 0 such that var[ i (a)] ≤ σ 2 and E[ i (a)] = 0 for all a ∈ A and i ∈ I. 15 The random variables {c i } i∈I are independent of the random functions { i } i∈I .
Finally, we assume the utility profile {u i } i∈I satisfies the following technical property.
Here, ∆ is the minimum social welfare gap between the optimal policy and the next-best policy. If a voting rule acts as an "estimator" of the utilitarian SWF, then we need the error of this estimate to be smaller than ∆, in order for the rule to select the optimal policy, and not the next-best policy. 17 Our first result says that, despite the uncertainties surrounding {c i } i∈I and { i } i∈I , evaluative voting has a very good chance of maximizing the utilitarian social welfare function U I when the population is large.
14 Note that we do not assume that, for a fixed voter i in I, the random errors i (a) and i (b) are independent for different alternatives a and b in A.
15 This is consistent with the fact that i (a i ) = i (a i ) = 0 with certainty -this just means that the distributions of i (a i ) and i (a i ) are point masses.
16 Most of our results involve taking a limit as I→∞. In these results, ∆ is to be held constant as I→∞. 17 Of course, if ∆ was very small, then selecting the next-best policy would not be a catastrophe; thus, we will relax condition (E3) in Proposition 2 below. Theorem 1 For every voter i in I, let u i : A−→R be a utility function. Suppose that the profile {u i } i∈I satisfies (E3), and suppose {c i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and {v i } i∈I are randomly generated according to rules (E1) and (E2). Define V I and U I as in equations (1) and (2).
Then lim

I→∞
Prob argmax
We can refine this result in three ways. First, we can drop condition (E3). Second, and relatedly, instead of demanding that the outcome of evaluative voting exactly maximizes U I , we can allow the possibility that it only almost maximizes U I -something which would be almost as good, for practical purposes. Third, we can estimate how large the population needs to be in order to achieve such "almost-maximization" with a certain probability. To achieve these refinements, we need some more notation. For any utility profile {u i } i∈I , if U I is as in equation (2), then let
This is the theoretical maximum social welfare, which would be obtained from the optimal social alternative. Let δ > 0 represent a "social suboptimality tolerance", and let p > 0 represent the probability that this tolerance will be exceeded (the social planner wants both of these to be small). For any values of δ and p, we define
Our next result says that, for any population larger than I(δ, p), any V I -maximizing social alternative will produce a utilitarian social welfare within δ of the theoretical optimum, with probability at least 1 − p.
Proposition 2 For every voter i in I, let u i : A−→R be a utility function. Suppose {c i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and {v i } i∈I satisfy (E1) and (E2). Define V I , U I , and U * I as in equations (1), (2), and (4). For any δ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1),
The evaluative voting rule prevents voters from strategically exaggerating their utility functions, but strategic voting is still possible. In general, each voter's best response is to assign a score of either 0 or 1 to each alternative in A (Núñez and Laslier, 2014) . In this case, evaluative voting reduces to approval voting.
Approval voting
18 works as follows:
1. Each voter i identifies a subset of alternatives in A which she "approves".
2. For each social alternative a in A, count how many voters approve a.
3. Choose the alternative which is approved by the most voters.
Formally, for every voter i in I, let G i ⊆ A be the set of alternatives which i approves; we refer to G i as her approval set. Let G := {G i } i∈I be the profile of the voters' approval sets. For any social alternative a in A, we define its approval score by:
For every i in I, let u i : A−→R be i's cardinal utility function, and let c i > 0 be a "calibration constant", which we will use to make cardinal interpersonal utility comparisons. We suppose that the functions c i u i and c j u j are interpersonally comparable for all voters i and j in I. In other words, for any alternatives a, b, c, and
, then the welfare that voter i gains in moving from alternative a to alternative b is exactly the same as the welfare that voter j gains in moving from c to d. We would therefore like to maximize the utilitarian social welfare function U I : A−→R defined by
If the approval set G i is a "noisy signal" of u i (for every voter i in I), then the aggregate approval score V G could be seen as a "noisy signal" of the social welfare function U I . Thus, under the right conditions, approval voting should maximize utilitarian social welfare. Weber (1978) showed this was true when voters have i.u.d. utility functions over a set of three alternatives. The goal of this section is to make this intuition precise in a much more general setting. Each voter's true utility function is unknown to the social planner. So is the process by which each voter converts her utility function into an approval set. The planner deals with this uncertainty by treating these as random variables, described by some probabalistic model. We will consider two different models: the Threshold Model and the Selection Model. The Threshold Model first assigns each voter a random utility for each social alternative, and then selects her approval set from these alternatives by means of a randomly determined threshold. The Selection Model first selects an approval set for each voter (this process may be random or deterministic), and then randomly assigns utilities to each social alternative, according to a probability distribution which depends on whether or not it is in the approval set. Both models yield the same conclusion: in a large population, approval voting maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function, with high probability.
The Threshold Model
For each voter i in I, and every alternative a in A, let u i a be the utility which i assigns to a. We suppose that i also identifies an approval threshold θ i . She then defines her approval set G i to be all social alternatives whose utility exceeds θ i .
19 That is:
We make the following assumptions:
(Θ1) Same as (E1).
(Θ2) The utilities {u i a ; a ∈ A and i ∈ I} are i.i.d. random variables with finite variance. The variables {c i } i∈I and {u i } i∈I are all independent.
(Θ3) Same as (E3).
Finally, we assume:
(Θ0) The thresholds {θ i } i∈I are independent random variables (not necessarily identically distributed). For any i ∈ I, the random threshold θ i may depend on {u i a } a∈A . But {θ i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I are independent. Finally,
Assumptions (Θ1) and (Θ3) have the same interpretations as (E1) and (E3). Assumption (Θ2) describes the planner's ignorance about people's true utility functions, while (Θ0) describes her ignorance about how they convert these utility functions into approval sets, except for the fact that they follow rule (7). The condition "0 < Prob[u i a ≥ θ i ] < 1" simply guarantees that the output of rule (7) is almost-surely nondegenerate. The next result says that, if a large population of voters satisfies hypotheses (Θ0)-(Θ3), then with very high probability, approval voting will maximize the utilitarian social welfare function U I in equation (6).
Theorem 3 Suppose {u i } i∈I , {θ i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I satisfy (Θ0)-(Θ3), and the approval profile G = {G i } i∈I is defined by rule (7). Then lim
One notable difference between Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 is that the former places essentially no conditions on the utility functions {u i } i∈I , whereas the latter requires these utility functions to be i.i.d. random variables. The reason is that approval voting provides us with less information about individual utility functions than evaluative voting. A voter's response in evaluative voting tells us her entire utility function, up to a scalar multiple; the only uncertainty is the magnitude of this scalar. But her approval set only tells us whether each she assigns a 'high' or 'low' utility to each alternative. Thus, without further information about the conditional probability distributions of these 'high' and 'low' utilities, it is not possible for us to estimate the utilitarian social welfare function.
Note that the total ignorance described by (Θ2) implies both a sort of a priori anonymity (i.e. all voters are indistinguishible, a priori) and a priori neutrality (i.e. all social alternatives are indistinguishible, a priori). Thus, it does not allow us to incorporate the knowledge that certain alternatives (e.g. low taxes) tend to be favoured by certain classes of voters (e.g. business owners). Nor does it allow us to incorporate the knowledge that people's preferences may be correlated (e.g. voters who favour low taxes tend to also favour less regulation, because they are often business owners). Likewise, (Θ0) does not allow us to incorporate knowledge that certain types of voters tend to set higher thresholds than others for certain types of policy problems. (However, (Θ1), like (E1), does allow certain types of voters to tend towards more intense preferences than others.) Thus, when applied to a specific policy problem, these assumptions may be less than optimal; a voting rule more closely optimized to the specific probability distribution of utility functions in a society might yield a higher expected social welfare.
20
However, in many cases, we may not have actionable information about the distribution of utility functions. Furthermore, at a political level, it could be problematic to deploy a "customized" voting rule for each policy issue; it would be too easy for such "customization" to smuggle in the biases of the social planner, either deliberately or inadvertently. Even if these customized voting rules were developed through some impeccably impartial process, based on objective and publicly known facts about the statistical distribution of voter preferences, there might remain the suspicion that the outcome was due to some manipulation of this process, and this could undermine its legitimacy. If this is a real concern, then it is important to fix a single voting rule once and for all when designing the constitution, and then apply this one voting rule to all policy questions. In the design of such a constitution, the a priori anonymity and neutrality of (Θ0) and (Θ2) is entirely appropriate.
The Selection Model
In our second model, the approval set of each voter is exogenously and arbitrary. Her approval set might be fixed in advance, or it might be generated by some other random process. (If the voters' approval sets are random variables, then we do not need to assume that they are either independent, or identically distributed.) Each voter assigns random utilities to each alternative, conditional on whether or not it is in her approval set.
Formally, for each i in I, let G i be the (exogenous) approval set of voter i, and let B i := A \ G i . Let γ and β be two finite-variance probability measures on R, 21 such that the mean value of γ is strictly larger than that of β. We make the following assumptions:
(S1) Same as (Θ1) and (E1).
The random variables {c i ; i ∈ I} and {u i (a); i ∈ I and a ∈ A} are all 20 For example, the scoring rules of Kim (2014; §5) and the weighted majority rules of Bordley (1985b Bordley ( , 1986 , Fleurbaey (2009) and Azrieli and Kim (2014; §4) have this feature.
21 These are not necessarily Gamma or Beta distributions.
22 If the supports of γ and β overlap, then there is a chance that the voter will assign a lower utility to some element of G i than she assigns to some element of B i . This would appear somewhat irrational. To exclude this, one could assume that γ is a finite-variance probability measure on (0, ∞), while β is a finite-variance probability measure on (−∞, 0]. But our results do not require this assumption.
independent. (S3) Same as (Θ3) and (E3).
The interpretation of (S1) is the same as (E1) or (Θ1). The interpretation of (S2) is the same as (Θ2); it implies both a sort of a priori anonymity and a priori neutrality. The difference is that now we can distinguish, a priori between those alternatives which are in a voter's approval set and those which aren't, and give them different statistical treatments. Since the approval sets themselves are exogenous, this model is perfectly able to cope with situations where a voter's approval choices are highly correlated, both with other voters and with other known facts about that voter (e.g. the fact that business owners tend to approve of tax reduction and also tend to approve of deregulation). The model in effect makes no assumptions about the statistical distribution of approval sets (it doesn't even treat them as random). However, the model still does not allow correlations of utility within each voter's approval set (e.g. a correlation between the utility that a voter assigns to a tax reduction and the utility she assigns to a deregulation policy, given that she has approved of both). The earlier remarks about constitutional design still apply. Once again, if a large population of voters satisfies these hypotheses, then with very high probability, approval voting will maximize the utilitarian social welfare function U I in equation (6).
Theorem 4 Let G = {G i } i∈I be an arbitrary approval profile. If {u i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I satisfy hypotheses (S1)-(S3), then lim
As in Section 2, we would like to refine Theorems 3 and 4 by dropping conditions (Θ3) and (S3). We would also like to estimate how large the population must be in order for approval voting to "almost-maximize" U I with a certain probability, by analogy with Proposition 2. For brevity, we will present such a result only for the Selection Model, but a similar result can be proved for the Threshold Model. Let U * I := max{U I (a); a ∈ A}.
Proposition 5 Let G = {G i } i∈I be an arbitrary approval profile. If {u i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I satisfy (S1) and (S2), then for any δ > 0, we have
Furthermore, if the fourth moments of γ and β are finite, then there are constants C 1 , C 2 > 0 (determined by γ, β, and σ 2 c ) such that, for any p > 0, if I ≥ C 1 /p and I ≥ C 2 /p δ 2 , then Prob [U I (a) < U * I − δ] < p for all a ∈ Appr(G).
Rank scoring rules
One concern with approval voting is that it gives each voter very little ability to express the intensity of her preference for or against each alternative. For example, if a voter does not include a certain alternative in her approval set, this may be because she actively dislikes this alternative, or it may simply be because she has no strong feelings either way, or perhaps inadequate knowledge of this alternative, and for this reason she "abstains" from endorsing it. Approval voting is unable to distinguish between voting against and abstention. For this reason, Alcantud and Laruelle (2014) propose "dis&approval" voting, which allows a voter three choices for each alternative: approve, disapprove, or abstain. However, "dis&approval" voting still does not distiguish between "strong" (dis)approval and "weak" (dis)approval. For this purpose, we turn to rank scoring rules.
Let N := A. Let s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ · · · ≤ s N be real numbers, and define s := (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N ). The s-rank scoring rule on A is defined as follows:
1. For every voter i in I, let i denote her (strict) ordinal preferences on A. Recently, Apesteguia et al. (2011; Theorem 3 .1) have shown that, amongst all voting rules, rank scoring rules are the ones which maximize the expected value of the utilitarian social welfare function (under certain conditions). Furthermore, they characterized the optimal rank scoring rule in terms of the probability distribution of the voters' utility functions -to be precise, in terms of the expected order statistics of this distribution. Our results in this section are complementary. We work with a much broader class of probability distributions than Apesteguia et al. (2011) . We will show that, if the profile {u i } i∈I arises from this class, then there exists a rank scoring rule which will come arbitrarily close to selecting a utilitarian optimum, with very high probability as I→∞. Thus, while Apesteguia et al. (2011) show that the optimal rank scoring rule is "better on average" than any other voting rule, we show that it is, in fact "almost perfect", in the limit of a large population.
For every alternative a in
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As in Section 3, we will present two stochastic models of voter preference formation. In the Endogenous Preference model, the voters' utility functions are i.i.d. random variables, and their ordinal preferences are determined by these utility functions. In the Exogenous preference model, the voter's ordinal preferences are exogenous and arbitrary, and their utility functions are random variables conditional on these preferences.
Endogenous Preferences
For each voter i in I, we will represent her utility function over A as an N -dimensional vector u i = (u i a ) a∈A ∈ R A . Let µ be a finite-variance 24 probability measure on R A ; we will use this probability measure to randomly generate the utility functions of the voters. For any a, b ∈ A, we assume that µ{u ∈ R A ; u a = u b } = 0 (i.e. almost surely, no two alternatives yield the same utility). We also make the following assumptions.
(N0) µ is symmetric under all coordinate permutations.
(N1) Same as (S1), (Θ1), and (E1).
(N2) The utility functions {u i } i∈I are independent, µ-random vectors. Also, {u i } i∈I are independent of {c i } i∈I .
(N3) Same as (S3), (Θ3), and (E3).
Note that we do not assume, for any particular voter i, that the utilities she assigns to different alternatives a and b are independent random variables: the probability measure µ may allow for arbitrary correlations between u conditional on the same information about the rank of a. Hypothesis (N1) is comparable to (S1) or (Θ1). Hypothesis (N2) is comparable to (S2) or (Θ2): it is a sort of a priori anonymity, saying that all voters are indistinguishable, a priori. However, (N2) supposes a richer level of knowledge than (S2) or (Θ2); for example, we might know that, on average, each voter's second-best and third-best alternatives obtain, respectively 90% and 75% of the utility of her favourite alternative (assuming her worst alternative has utility 0). We will now see how to incorporate such knowledge into the optimal rank scoring rule.
Let u ∈ R A be a µ-random variable. Rearrange the coordinates of u in increasing order, to get a vector u := ( u 1 , . . . , u N ), where u 1 ≤ u 2 ≤ · · · ≤ u N . For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let s n be the expected value of u n ; this yields a vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s N ). The next result says that, if a large population of voters satisfies hypotheses (N0)-(N3), then with very high probability, the s-rank scoring rule will maximize the utilitarian social welfare function U I in equation (6).
Theorem 6 Suppose {u i } i∈I , and {c i } i∈I satisfy (N0)-(N3), and let P = { i } i∈I be the ordinal preference profile defined by {u i } i∈I .
25 Then
Impartial Culture. As we have emphasized, hypothesis (N2) does not require the utilities {u i a } a∈A to be i.i.d. random variables, for any particular voter i. However, it is certainly compatible with this additional assumption. This corresponds to the special case of the model where µ is a Cartesian product of N copies of some underlying finite-variance, nonatomic probability measure ρ on R. In this case, the utilities {u i a ; i ∈ I and a ∈ A} are all independent, ρ-random variables (this is a version of the so-called "Impartial Culture" model). If we make the further assumption that ρ is absolutely continuous and has compact support, and assume that c i := 1 for every voter i in I, then we obtain the models considered by Weber (1978) and Apesteguia et al. (2011) . But the Endogenous Preference model is much more general than this Impartial Culture model. 
Exogenous Preferences
In our second model, the preference orders of the voters are exogenous and arbitrary. These preference orders may themselves be random variables, or they may be determined in some other way. (If they are random variables, then we do not assume that they are independent or identically distributed. In particular, unlike the Impartial Culture model, we do not suppose that all N ! possible ordinal preferences on A are equally likely to occur in P.) The model then assigns each voter a random utility for each alternative, conditional on her preference order.
Formally, let U := {u ∈ R N ; u 1 < u 2 < · · · < u N }, and let λ be a finite-variance probability measure on U. For every voter i in I, let i denote i's (exogenous) preference order over A. We make the following assumptions:
(X1) Same as (N1), (S1), (Θ1) and (E1).
(X2) The utility vectors {u i } i∈I are independent random vectors, generated as follows. For each i ∈ I, we obtain u i by taking a λ-random variable u i , and rearranging the coordinates to agree with the preference order i . The random variables {u i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I are independent.
(X3) Same as (N3), (S3), (Θ3), and (E3).
Once again, we do not assume, for any particular voter i, that the utilities she assigns to different alternatives a and b are independent random variables, even after we condition on i ; the probability measure λ may allow for arbitrary correlations between u i a and u i b . However, (X2) has a consequence similar to (N0): given two voters i and j, and two alternatives a and b, if a has the same rank with respect to i as b does with respect to j , then the expected value of u i a is the same as that of u j b . The interpretation of hypothesis (X1) is the same as to (N1). Hypothesis (X2) is comparable to (N2): it is a sort of a priori anonymity, saying that all voters are indistinguishable, a priori, except for their exogenous ordinal preferences.
For all k ∈ [1 . . . N ], let s k be the expected value of u k , where (u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ U is a λ-random variable. Let s := (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N ) . The next result says that, if a large population of voters satisfies hypotheses (X1)-(X3), then with very high probability, the s-rank scoring rule will maximize the utilitarian social welfare function U I in equation (6).
Theorem 7 Let P = { i } i∈I be an arbitrary ordinal preference profile. Suppose {u i } i∈I , and {c i } i∈I satisfy (X1)-(X3). Then the limit (9) holds.
As in Sections 2 and 3, we would like to refine Theorems 6 and 7 by dropping conditions (N3) and (X3). We would also like to estimate how large the population must be in order for the rank scoring rule to "almost-maximize" U I with a certain probability, by analogy with Propositions 2 and 5. For brevity, we will present such a result only for the Exogenous Preference model, but a similar result can be proved for the Endogenous Preference model. As usual, let U * I := max{U I (a); a ∈ A}.
Proposition 8 Let P = { i } i∈I be an arbitrary ordinal preference profile. If {u i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I satisfy (X1) and (X2), then for any δ > 0, we have
Furthermore, if the fourth moment of λ is finite, 27 then there are constants C 1 , C 2 > 0 (determined by λ and σ 2 c ) such that, for any p > 0, if I ≥ C 1 /p and I ≥ C 2 /p δ 2 , then Prob [U I (a < U * I − δ] < p, for all a ∈ Score s (P).
Conditional Impartial Culture. Theorem 6 is in fact a consequence of Theorem 7; in effect, the Exogenous Preference model can be intepreted as the Endogenous Preference model, conditional on a particular realization of the (random) ordinal preference profile { i } i∈I . Theorem 7 says that limit (9) holds for any particular realization of { i } i∈I . Theorem 6 follows from this fact by integrating over all possible realizations of { i } i∈I .
(See Appendix B for details.)
At the end of Section 4.1, we explained how the "Impartial Culture" model was a special case of the Endogenous Preferences model. If we condition on a particular realization of { i } i∈I , we obtain the Conditional Impartial Culture model. To be precise, let ρ be a probability measure on R with finite variance and no atoms. For every voter i in I, let i be voter i's (exogenous) ordinal preference relation on A. In this case, hypothesis (X2) takes the following form:
27 The fourth moment of the multivariate probability measure λ is the integral The rank scoring rule described prior to Theorem 7 now has the following construction. Take a random sample of N independent random variables drawn from ρ, and compute the order statistics of this sample; this yields N new random variables (which are neither independent, nor identically distributed). Let s By comparision, the Borda rule uses the scoring vector (−1, −0.66, −0.33, 0, 0.33, 0.66, 1) .
Unfortunately, the expected values of order statistics are quite hard to compute for many probability distributions. Harter and Balakrishnan (1996) provide tables of these expected values for most of the common probability distributions (e.g. normal, exponential, Weibull, etc.) ; from this data it is easy to design the appropriate rank scoring rule.
Conclusion
This paper has neglected strategic voting and implementation issues. However, simulation results by Lehtinen (2007 Lehtinen ( , 2008 suggest that strategic voting can often improve the utilitarian efficiency of some of the voting rules discussed in this paper. Furthermore, the results of Kim (2014) show that, with stochastically independent voters, the rank scoring rules considered in Section 4 are truth-revealing in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
29 Finally, the central premise of our results is that it is sufficient to obtain an arbitrarily high probability of selecting a utilitarian optimum, rather than certainty. This is exactly the same premise as the theory of virtual implementation introduced by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) . Virtual implementation is an extremely powerful and versatile implementation technology. For example, if the voters have complete information about one another, then any social choice rule can be virtually implemented in Nash equilibrium (Abreu and Sen, 1991) or iterated undominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima, 1992) . Even with incomplete information, a very large class of social choice rules can be virtually implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Serrano and Vohra, 2005) , or even robustly virtually implemented (Artemov et al., 2013) . Since virtual implementation is the implementation technology most suited to the probabilistic approach taken in this paper, we can consider the implementation problem to be essentially solved, for our purposes.
We have also assumed that the random variables associated with different voters are independent.
30 This excludes the possibility that voters belonging to a particular community or social group might exhibit correlations in their utility functions, preference intensities, errors, and/or approval thresholds. Empirical data suggests that these independence assumptions are false (Gelman et al., 2004) . But they were made for expositional simplicity, rather than technical necessity. The results in this paper are derived using results from Section 2 of Pivato (2014b) , which assumes stochastically independent voters. Section 3 of Pivato (2014b) extends these results to correlated voters, assuming the correlation strength is not too strong.
31 Using this extension, it would be straightforward to extend the results of the present paper to correlated voters.
For a large enough population, our results suggest that simple and popular voting rules 29 Weber (1978) also states a special case of this result. However, a BNE with stochastically independent voters assumes that each voter is totally ignorant about the preferences of all other voters when she votes; this would not seem very realistic in many situations.
30 This assumption is shared by virtually all the literature reviewed in Section 1, except for Bordley (1985b Bordley ( , 1986 , Fleurbaey (2009), and Hartmann (2010) . 31 To be more precise, we need an asymptotic condition on the L 1 norm of the covariance matrix of the random variables {c i } i∈I and {u i } i∈I , as I→∞.
such as the Borda rule or approval voting have a very high probability of selecting an alternative which maximizes or almost-maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. However, each result depends on specific assumptions about the statistical distribution of utility functions in the population. Thus, to select the best rule, we must know something about this distribution. The statistical distribution of utility functions probably depends on both the society and the particular policy problem. Thus, different voting rules will be optimal in different situations. In some situations, none of the voting rules considered here may be optimal, from a utilitarian perspective. This suggests a two-stage approach. In the first stage, estimate the utility functions of some statistically representative sample of the population (e.g. using a survey). Use this data to estimate the statistical distribution of utilities, and then determine which voting rule (if any) is optimal, given this distribution. If the statistical distribution of utility functions satisfies the hypotheses of one of the results in this paper, then in the second stage, we can use the corresponding voting rule to make the collective decision. Otherwise, we must resort to some other method -perhaps the methods considered in Pivato (2014a,b) or Kim (2014) .
are independent 32 (but not necessarily identically distributed), and they all have an expected value of 0 and a variance less than or equal some constant σ 2 > 0.
Finally, the random variables {c i } i∈I are independent of the random functions { i } i∈I .
We assume that the utility profile {u i } i∈I satisfies one or both of the following conditions.
(U3) There is a constant ∆ > 0 such that max A (U I ) − U I (a) > ∆ for every a ∈ argmax A (U I ).
(U4) There is a constant M > 0 such that 1 I i∈I u i (a) 2 < M 2 for every a in A.
Note that, while we assume that {v i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I are random variables, we make no assumptions about the mechanism generating the underlying profile of utility functions {u i } i∈I . These utility functions might be fixed in advance, or they might themselves be generated by some other random process, as long as they satisfy (U4) and (U3). Define the function V I : A−→R as in equation (1), and define the SWF U I : A−→R as in equation (6). Here is Theorem 1 of Pivato (2014b).
Theorem A1 For every i in I, let u i : A−→R be a utility function. Suppose the profile {u i } i∈I satisfies (U3) and (U4). If {c i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and {v i } i∈I are randomly generated according to rules (U1) and (U2), then lim
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For any δ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1), we define
Define U * I := max {U I (a) ; a ∈ A}. Here is Theorem 2 of Pivato (2014b).
Theorem A2 Suppose {u i } i∈I , {c i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and {v i } i∈I satisfy (U1), (U2) and (U4). 
(The second equality is by equation (7).) Then define i (a) : 
; thus, it suffices to compute the asymptotic probability that argmax A ( V I ) ⊆ argmax A (U I ), using Theorem A1. To do this, we must verify hypotheses (U1)-(U4). First, let u := E[u 
I→∞
Prob M and the profile {u i } i∈I satisfy condition (U4) = 1.
is an average of I independent random variables (by (Θ2)), each with expected value M 2 . Thus, the Law of Large Numbers implies that
Thus, since A is finite, the claim follows.
Hypotheses (Θ0) and (Θ2) imply that { u i } i∈I , { v i } i∈I and { i } i∈I satisfy (U2). Hypothesis (Θ1) implies that { c i } i∈I satisfies (U1), and hypothesis (Θ3) implies that { u i } i∈I satisfies (U3) (with ∆ := ∆/c). Now Apply Theorem A1 to { u i } i∈I , { v i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and { c i } i∈I to derive the claimed asymptotic probability. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. The strategy is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Let g be the mean value of γ, and let b be the mean value of β; thus g > b. For all i ∈ I, define v i : A−→R by . Let V I = i∈I v i . Then V I = V G +(a constant). Thus, argmax A ( V I ) = argmax A (V G ). But argmax A (V G ) = Appr(G); thus, it suffices to compute the asymptotic probability that argmax A ( V I ) ⊆ argmax A (U I ), using Theorem A1.
The proof is very similar to the proof of Claim 8.1 in the proof of Proposition 8 (below).
Recall that { u i } i∈I , { v i } i∈I and { i } i∈I satisfy (U2), with σ 2 := max{var(γ), var(β}/c 2 . For any δ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1), define I(δ, p) as in equation (A1). Finally, define C 2 := 8 A ( M 2 σ 2 c + σ 2 ). Thus, for any p, δ ∈ (0, 1), if I > C 2 /p δ 2 , then I > I(δ, p/2), so that, for any a ∈ Appr(G) = argmax A ( V I ), Theorem A2 says Prob U I (a) < U * I − δ M and { u i } i∈I satisfy (U4) < p 2 .
If I > C 1 /p also, then Theorem 6 follows from Theorem 7, so we will prove that first.
Proof of Theorem 7. Since Score s (P) = argmax A (V s P ), it suffices to compute the asymptotic probability that argmax A (V s P ) ⊆ argmax A (U I ), as I→∞. As usual, we will use Theorem A1. Hypothesis (X1) implies (U1). For all i ∈ I and all a ∈ A, if we know that i ranks a in kth place (in particular, if we know the preference order i ), then the expected value of u i (a), conditional on this information, is s k . But, by definition, v i (a) = s k . Thus, E[u i (a) | i ] = v i (a). Thus, if we define i (a) := u i (a) − v i (a), then E[ i (a) | i ] = 0. By hypothesis, the variance of the random variable u i (a) is finite; thus, the variance of i (a) is finite. Finally, by hypothesis (X2), the random functions {u i } i∈I are independent of one another and independent of {c i } i∈I . Thus, the random functions { i } i∈I are independent of one another and independent of {c i } i∈I . This establishes (U2). It remains to verify (U4).
Let u = ( u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ U be a λ-random vector. The coordinates u 1 , . . . , u N are themselves random variables (neither independent, nor identically distributed). Let σ Finally, hypothesis (X3) implies that {u i } i∈I satisfy (U3). Now apply Theorem A1 to {u i } i∈I , {v i } i∈I , { i } i∈I and {c i } i∈I to derive the limit (9).
2
Proof of Theorem 6. Define U as in Section 4.2, and let λ be the conditionalization of µ on U. In the Endogenous Preference model of Section 4.1, the ordinal preference profile P = { i } i∈I is a random variable (determined by the underlying cardinal utility profile {u i } i∈I . However, if we fix a particular realization of P, then conditional on this realization, the probability distribution of the cardinal profile {u i } i∈I is described by λ via the Exogenous Preference model of Section 4.2. Thus, for any particular realization of P, Theorem 7 implies that the limit (9) holds.
34 Thus, integrating over all possible realizations of P, and applying Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem, we conclude that the limit (9) holds unconditionally.
35
2
Proof of Proposition 8. We will apply Theorem A2. Define { i } i∈I and M as in the proof of Theorem 7. Claim 7.1 established that lim
I→∞
Prob[M and the profile {u i } i∈I satisfy condition (U4)] = 1. However, to obtain the more precise estimate of convergence speed, we need the next observation.
Claim 8.1:
Suppose the fourth moment of λ is finite. Then there is some C 1 > 0 (determined by λ) such that, for any p ∈ (0, 1), if I > C 1 /p, then Prob M and {u i } i∈I violate condition (U4) < p 2 .
Proof. If the fourth moment of λ is finite, then there is some C > 0 such that for any a ∈ A, the fourth moments of each of the random variables {u i (a)} i∈I is less than C . In other words, the second moments of each of the random variables {u i (a) 2 } i∈I is less than C . This implies that there is some C > 0 such that the variance of each of {u i (a) 2 } i∈I is less than C . Also, these random variables are independent. Thus,
Next, inequality (B2) says each of {u i (a) 2 } i∈I has expected value less than M 2 . Thus,
34 To be precise, we fix an infinite sequence ( n ) ∞ n=1 of ordinal preferences. Then, for any particular value of I, we identify I with [1 . . . I] and let P = { n } I n=1 . Theorem 7 then applies for every possible infinite sequence. 35 The set of all possible infinite sequences ( n ) ∞ n=1 has a natural sigma-algebra (generated by "cylinder sets", which are defined by fixing values for any finite number of coordinates). The Endogenous Preference model defines a probability measure on this sigma algebra (in fact, it is a Bernoulli stochastic process). In the last step of the proof, we integrate with respect to this probability measure.
Thus, Chebyshev's inequality and inequalities (B3) and (B4) imply that there is some C 1 > 0 (determined by C ) such that, for any p > 0, if I > C 1 /p, then
Now, if the profile {u i } i∈I and M to violate condition (U4), then
